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Bargaining under the Charter:  
The Enduring Problem of 
Substantive Equality 
Judy Fudge* 
Collective bargaining also enhances the Charter value of equality. One 
of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate 
the historical inequality between employers and employees.1  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Health Services and 
Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia2 was 
both remarkable and unexpected; not only did the Court expressly 
overrule 20 years of jurisprudence interpreting the freedom of 
association as excluding collective bargaining,3 it did so in a case that 
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1
  Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 84 [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”]. 
2
  Id. 
3
  In the Labour Trilogy, which refers to three concurrently released appeals (Reference re 
Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Alberta Reference”], Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 
9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.), and RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
460 (S.C.C.)), a plurality of the Court held that s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”] did not include collective bargaining. The main reasons were 
delivered in the Alberta Reference, a case involving compulsory arbitration to resolve impasses in 
collective bargaining and a prohibition on strikes. Of the six justices participating in the case, three 
held that collective bargaining was not protected by s. 2(d); four held that strike activity was not 
protected. The next case to deal with the issue was Professional Institute of the Public Service of 
Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] S.C.J. No. 75, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PIPSC”], in which the Government of the Northwest Territories refused to 
enact legislation required in order for the PIPSC (union) to bargain collectively on behalf of nurses. 
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dealt with collective bargaining in the health-care sector, a politically 
charged area in which the Court’s recent forays had been extremely 
controversial.4 The case has garnered a great deal of attention from 
constitutional pundits who predict dire consequences for both the health 
care system and the “Canadian constitutional fabric”, labour lawyers and 
academics who study labour law and workers’ rights.5 Even among 
labour law academics sympathetic to providing constitutional protection 
for workers’ rights, the Court’s reasoning has attracted a fair measure of 
criticism.6 Moreover, the case has generated a great deal of speculation 
regarding the scope of the constitutional protection of freedom of 
association. In some (but not other) instances, provincial governments 
have responded to the Court’s ruling by extending labour legislation to 
include previously excluded groups of government and broader public 
sector employees.7 It has also triggered a spurt of litigation that 
                                                                                                             
A majority of four held that collective bargaining was not protected by s. 2(d). In 2001 in Dunmore 
v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Dunmore”], the Court affirmed its position that freedom of association protected in the Charter did 
not include collective bargaining. 
4
  The Supreme Court has evinced great concern for the fiscal health of Canada’s health-
care sector, which is essentially a single (government) payer system. In Chaoulli v. Quebec 
(Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.), the Court opened the door 
to the privatization of health care by permitting private health insurance in limited circumstances in 
Quebec. In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland Assn. of Public Employees (NAPE), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Newfoundland v. NAPE”], the 
Court accepted the Newfoundland government’s fiscal concerns as an acceptable justification to 
cancel an agreed upon pay equity payment and thereby to violate women’s equality rights. 
5
  Pamela Fayerman, “Court ruling ‘bolsters’ private health care; Governments will now 
find it harder to restructure system, legal expert says” Vancouver Sun, June 20, 2007, at B1, reported 
that Patrick Monahan told a B.C. Government Health symposium that one of the unintended 
consequences of the B.C. Health Services case is that it will result in a market for supplementary 
private health insurance to pay for care in the private sector. According to Robert Charney, in “The 
Contract Clause Comes to Canada: The British Columbia B.C. Health Services Case and the 
Sanctity of Collective Agreements” (unpublished paper), the decision has the potential to result in “a 
significant interference with government regulation, and to impose laissez-faire economic principles 
on the Canadian constitutional fabric”. (Quoted in Jamie Cameron, “Due Process, Collective 
Bargaining and Section 2(d) of the Charter: A Comment on B.C. Health Services” (2008) 42 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 131, at 142, fn. 45.) 
6
  See Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of 
Labour History in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151 [hereinafter 
“Tucker”], for a criticism of the Supreme Court of Canada’s use of history, and Brian Langille, 
“Can We Rely on the ILO? (Don’t Ask the Supreme Court of Canada)” (2008) 13 C.L.E.L.J. 363, 
who criticizes the decision for misunderstanding international labour law.  
7
  About 2,000 seasonal and casual workers in Nova Scotia will receive collective 
bargaining rights under proposed legislation, “Seasonal workers to gain bargaining rights, benefit” 
The Globe and Mail, December 1, 2007, at A13. The Chair of the Labour Relations Board, Kevin 
Whitaker, was appointed by the Ontario government to study and to report on whether collective 
bargaining rights should be extended to part-time college teachers. His February 2008 report, A 
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challenges a raft of restrictive labour legislation as unconstitutional.8 A 
recent decision by the Quebec Superior Court,9 which (like the B.C. 
case) involved legislation that radically restructured labour relations and 
collective bargaining in the health care sector, suggests that the B.C. 
Health Services case will be stirring up a lot of constitutional rights-
related dust unless the Supreme Court of Canada steps in to dampen the 
lower courts’ enthusiasm for a robust interpretation of freedom of 
association in the labour context.  
In an earlier article, I addressed two broad questions: what gave rise 
to the decision and what does it portend for the role of the courts in 
labour relations in Canada.10 This article builds upon the earlier one; 
                                                                                                             
Review of the College Collective Bargaining Act: Report of the Advisor to the Minister of Training, 
Colleges and Universities, recommended that collective bargaining rights be extended to part-time 
college teachers (at 52), noting that their exclusion from collective bargaining legislation was “most 
likely” a violation of the Charter (at 35). The Ontario government has introduced legislation (Bill 
90, Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, 2008, 49th Sess., Second Reading, June 12, 2008) 
extending collective bargaining rights to part-time college teachers (although this legislation would 
repeal provisions that currently prohibit members of the bargaining unit that is on strike or lockout 
from working during lawful collective action). However, no similar announcement has been made 
with respect to extending labour legislation to agricultural workers, who since 1996 have been going 
to court in order to challenge their exclusion from collective bargaining legislation in Ontario. See 
Dunmore, supra, note 3, and Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 45, 79 O.R. (3d) 
219 (Ont. S.C.J.), and related action [2008] O.J. No. 1219, 2008 ONCA 222 (Ont. C.A.).  
8
  British Columbia teachers’ unions are challenging legislation that restructured collective 
bargaining in the education sector. Members of the RCMP are challenging their exclusion from 
collective bargaining legislation in the federal sector. Four construction unions in Alberta are 
challenging provisions in the Alberta Labour Relations Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1 that prohibit 
unions and employers from resorting to strike and lockouts and substituting instead binding 
arbitration to resolve disputes relating to the negotiation of collective agreements if 75 per cent of 
the group of trade unions and registered employers’ organizations in the construction sector have 
entered into collective agreements. Two national unions representing professional employees in the 
federal public sector have launched legal challenges to provisions in the Public Service Labour 
Relations Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22, s. 2 that restricts their ability to negotiate staff, job classifications 
and pension benefits.  
9
  Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Québec (Procureur général), [2007] J.Q. no 
13421, 2007 QCCS 5513 (Que. C.S.) (November 30, 2007, Judge Claudine Roy). For an English 
summary of this decision see Lancaster House Headlines, January 10, 2008. This decision contrasts 
markedly with the decision by Farley J. in Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), supra, note 7. 
Justice Farley took a wait-and-see approach to a challenge brought by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers’ Union that the Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, 
c. 16, which was introduced by the government in response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Dunmore, supra, note 3, did not pass constitutional muster. 
10
  “The Supreme Court of Canada and the Right to Bargain Collectively in Canada and 
Beyond” (2008) 37(1) Indus. L.J. 25-48. In so doing, I examined the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
order to assess what it means for future constitutional challenges to limitations on collective 
bargaining. Using the Supreme Court’s reliance on international labour law in its interpretation of s. 
2(d) as my point of departure, I focused on two issues (whether the constitutional protection for 
freedom of association includes either the right to strike or promotes forms of minority unionism 
that fall outside the majority and exclusive unionism associated with the Wagner Act and its 
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however, it is neither descriptive nor predictive. Instead my goal is 
threefold. First, I will attempt to understand how the Supreme Court 
conceptualizes the constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively. 
The reason why I am concerned with this conceptual question is because 
I am troubled by the Court’s brief, and dismissive, treatment of the 
argument that the impugned legislation violated the affected health care 
workers’ equality rights. My suspicion is that the Court has adopted a 
purely formal or procedural approach to collective bargaining that 
cannot address the problem of substantive inequality. Although this 
approach may promote democratic deliberation by requiring governments 
to consult with the unions representing government employees who will 
be adversely effected by legislation that interferes with collective 
agreements, my concern is that it is disconnected from a broader, deeper 
and more secure normative base upon which to ground labour rights. 
Second, I will attempt to show that the Supreme Court’s dismissive 
treatment of the equality argument is not only inconsistent with its decision 
in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland Assn. of Public 
Employees (NAPE),11 it both reflects and promotes an idea of equality that is 
directed at fighting stereotypes to the exclusion of fostering substantive 
equality. Third, I want to suggest that constitutional litigation in the labour 
context supports and reinforces partisan politics by promoting a form of 
aggressive adversarialism that is antithetical to a principled approach to 
developing labour policy for an economy for which the prevailing form of 
industrial pluralism no longer fits.  
II. CONCEPTUALIZING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
In the B.C. Health Services case, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that “the s. 2(d) guarantee of freedom of association [in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms] protects the capacity of members of 
labour unions to engage in collective bargaining on workplace issues.”
12
 
Taking Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) as their point of 
departure, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., the authors of the judgment 
                                                                                                             
Canadian counterparts) in order to explore the relationship between domestic constitutional law in 
Canada and international norms in the labour context. 
11
  Supra, note 4. 
12
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 2.  
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with which five other members of the Court concurred,
13
 concluded “that 
the grounds advanced in the earlier decisions for the exclusion of 
collective bargaining from the Charter’s protection of freedom of 
association do not withstand principled scrutiny and should be rejected”.
14
 
This proposition along with three others — Canada’s historic 
recognition of the importance of collective bargaining to freedom of 
association, international law’s understanding of collective bargaining as 
an integral component of freedom of association and the compatibility of 
a right to collective bargaining with the promotion of other Charter 
rights, freedoms, and values — were advanced by the majority for the 
conclusion that section 2(d) of the Charter protects the process of 
collective bargaining. Instead of examining all four propositions, I shall 
focus on three aspects of the Court’s reasons: first, the shift from 
conceptualizing freedom of association as an individual to a collective 
right; second, the very limited positive obligation placed upon the state 
to protect collective bargaining; and third, the procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, nature of the obligation. 
1.  Overturning Precedent 
In the most astonishing part of the B.C. Health Services decision, 
McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. systematically subjected the five reasons 
provided in the Labour Trilogy and the subsequent decision of 
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Northwest 
Territories (Commissioner) (“PIPSC”) to critical analysis. They simply 
dismissed the first reason, that the rights to strike and to bargain 
collectively are “modern rights” created by legislation and not 
“fundamental freedoms”, as “fail[ing] to recognize the history of labour 
relations in Canada”,15 which they developed in their second proposition. 
They also dispatched the second reason, judicial deference to labour 
relations policy, as quickly as they did the first, claiming not only that it 
ignores history, but that, in addition, it takes “an overbroad view of 
judicial deference”.16 They asserted that the third reason, “freedom of 
association protects only those activities performable by an individual”, 
                                                                                                             
13
  Justice Deschamps also agreed that freedom of association included collective 
bargaining, but she both offered a different test for determining when that right had been violated 
and provided a different s. 1 analysis of what constituted a lawful infringement of the right.  
14
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 22. 
15
  Id., at para. 25. 
16
  Id., at para. 26. 
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was overtaken by Dunmore, where the Court recognized that certain 
collective activities have no individual analogue and yet are deserving of 
protection.17 They also rejected the fourth reason, suggested by 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in PIPSC, that freedom of association was not 
intended to protect the objects or goals of an association. The final and 
overarching problem that McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. identified with 
the majority judgments in the Labour Trilogy and PIPSC is their 
adoption of a decontexutalized approach to defining the scope of 
freedom of association, in contrast to the purposive approach taken to 
other Charter guarantees.  
The last three reasons offered by the Court for overturning precedent 
most directly pertain to the aspects of the analysis of the right to bargain 
collectively with which I am concerned, and with the exception of the 
fourth reason, which hinges on the distinction between the process of 
collective bargaining and its substantive outcomes, they are rooted in 
Dunmore. According to McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., Dunmore 
“clarified three developing aspects of the law: what constitutes 
interference with the ‘associational aspect’ of an activity; the need for a 
contextual approach to freedom of association; and the recognition that 
s. 2(d) can impose positive obligations on government”.18  
2.  Freedom to Associate: The Shift from an Individual to a 
Collective Right 
One of the most controversial aspects of the B.C. Health Services 
case is the Court’s conclusion that the “narrow focus on individual 
activities” in the Labour Trilogy and in PIPSC “has been overtaken by 
Dunmore, where this Court rejected the notion that freedom of 
association applies only to activities capable of performance by 
individuals”.19 In Dunmore, Bastarache J. held that “[t]o limit s. 2(d) to 
activities that are performable by individuals would … render futile 
these fundamental initiatives” since, as Dickson C.J.C. noted in his 
dissent in the Alberta Reference, some collective activities may, by their 
very nature, be incapable of being performed by an individual.20  
                                                                                                             
17
  Id., at paras. 27-28. 
18
  Id., at para. 31. 
19
  Dunmore, supra, note 3, at para. 28. 
20
  Id., at para. 16. 
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It is not precisely clear what Bastarache J. meant by characterizing 
collective bargaining as a collective, and not an individual, right. Part of 
the problem is that he failed to distinguish between the question of who 
possesses the right (the individual or the collective) and the question of 
the conditions necessary for the right’s successful exercise.21 Collective 
bargaining could be viewed as an individual right, in the sense that it 
vests in the individual worker and not in the collective, which is the 
trade union. But, even if it were to be considered an individual right, 
collective bargaining would be one of a hybrid nature, since it is a right 
that can only be enjoyed by individuals when it is exercised collectively.22 
This characterization of the right to bargain collectively is compatible 
with McIntyre J.’s approach in the Labour Trilogy, which was that 
individuals should be entitled to do collectively what they are entitled to 
do singly. Since individuals have the right singly to bargain their terms 
and conditions of employment, they should be permitted to bargain them 
collectively.23 In this conception of the right to bargain collectively the 
individual possesses the right, but the right is collective to the extent that 
it can only be exercised in concert with others. It recognizes both that 
there is an individual analogue to collective bargaining (which is 
individual bargaining) and that the right vests in the individual; however, 
it also appreciates the qualitative difference between individual and 
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, unlike individual bargaining, 
is essentially an associational activity. This approach is also compatible 
with Bastarache J.’s understanding of what Dickson C.J.C. meant in the 
Alberta Reference; “such activities may be collective in nature, in that 
they cannot be performed by individuals acting alone”.24  
However, at other points in his analysis Bastarache J. appears to 
conceive of the right to bargain collectively as a collective right in the 
sense that the right is vested in the collective (the union), and not in 
individual employees. In his dissenting judgment in the Alberta Reference, 
Dickson C.J.C. stated:  
There will, however, be occasions when no analogy involving individuals 
can be found for associational activity, or when a comparison between 
                                                                                                             
21
  Sheldon Leader, Freedom of Association: A Study in Labor Law and Political Theory 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), at 35 [hereinafter “Leader”]. 
22
  Id., at 32. 
23
  Diane Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour Law and the Charter” (2002) 40 (3&4) 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at 381-83. 
24
  Dunmore, supra, note 3, at para. 16 (emphasis added), quoting Alberta Reference, supra, 
note 3, at 367. 
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groups and individuals fails to capture the essence of a possible 
violation of associational rights.25 
Taking this statement as his warrant, Bastarache J. went on to assert:  
… the very notion of “association” recognizes the qualitative differences 
between individuals and collectivities. It recognizes that the press 
differs qualitatively from the journalist, the language community from 
the language speaker, the union from the worker. In all cases, the 
community assumes a life of its own and develops needs and priorities 
that differ from those of its individual members. … [B]ecause trade 
unions develop needs and priorities that are distinct from those of their 
members individually, they cannot function if the law protects 
exclusively what might be “the lawful activities of individuals”.26  
This conception of the right to bargain collectively is essentially 
collective; the right vests in the collective and not in the individual. 
However, the problem with this approach is that it begs the deeper 
normative question concerning the needs and priorities of collectivities 
such as trade unions that ought to be constitutionally protected.  
Whether the right to bargain collectively is considered to be a 
hybrid-individual right that can only by exercised collectively or a 
purely collective right has important consequences.27 A right to bargain 
collectively that vests in the individual would not depend upon the 
existence of an acceptable or officially recognized trade union. Even if 
the right were to vest in the individual, it would not necessarily follow 
that when the individual’s right clashes with the collective that the 
individual’s right would take precedence. How to resolve any conflict 
between the individual and the collective would depend on the rights and 
interests at stake and how they are exercised. However, if the right to 
bargain collectively is seen as vesting in the collective as an institution 
then the individual would not have the right to engage in collective 
pursuits outside of what he or she engages in through that institution. 
Moreover, vesting the right to bargain collectively in the collective 
would require some prior notion of and justification for the “acceptable” 
objects of unions. The problem with such an approach to the freedom to 
                                                                                                             
25
  Id., at para. 16, quoting Alberta Reference, id., at 367. 
26
  Id., at para. 17, quoted in B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 28. 
27
  As Leader demonstrates, these consequences are much more important when it comes to 
the right to strike, and he illustrates these consequences by contrasting the case of France, where the 
right to strike is an individual right that vests in the workers, with that of Germany, where the right 
is a collective one that vests in the union: see supra, note 21, at 183-200. 
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associate is that it precludes a range of alternative collectivities through 
which individuals can operate.28 In effect, what it does is elevate the 
tenets of a particular form of industrial pluralism, in which trade unions 
have exclusive bargaining rights, to a constitutional right. As Sheldon 
Leader notes, it is also inattentive to “the increasing cleavages of 
fundamental interest among the workforce on some issues”.29 
Although it is not clear in which way the freedom to associate and 
the right to bargain collectively are considered to be collective rights (as 
a hybrid-individual or purely collective right) in the B.C. Health Services 
case, both the extracts that McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. quote from 
Dunmore and their treatment of the history of collective bargaining in 
Canada suggest that they regard it as purely collective. Eric Tucker has 
demonstrated that the Court’s judgment rests upon and reinforces an 
industrial pluralist account of the history of Canadian collective 
bargaining law.30  
A central problem with the Court’s historical analysis of collective 
bargaining is that it elides the different legal statuses that the activity of 
collective bargaining has had at different periods of time. Although 
workers engaged in the activity of collective bargaining back in the early 
1800s, until 1872 it was, at the very least, potentially criminal activity. 
By the early 1900s, workers were free to bargain collectively in the 
sense that the state did not prohibit the activity. But collective bargaining 
only became a legal right in the mid-1940s when the state imposed a 
legal duty on employers to bargain in good faith with a certified trade 
union.31 Thus, while it is true that the social practice of collective 
bargaining has long been recognized, it does not follow from this 
observation that collective bargaining as a procedural right backed by the 
duty to bargain in good faith has long been recognized. The Court has 
attempted to construct a linear narrative of the history of Canadian 
labour law in which the immanent right to bargain collectively was 
realized during the Second World War with the advent of a Wagner-
based model of collective bargaining legislation.32 If the Canadian 
variety of majority-based, exclusive union representation backed by an 
                                                                                                             
28
  Id., at 205. 
29
  Id., at 269. Two-tier wage schemes, in which employees with shorter service than those 
with longer tenure receive less wages, and conflicts between workers who are parents of young 
children and those who are not are examples of such cleavages.  
30
  Tucker, supra, note 6.  
31
  Id. 
32
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 68. 
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obligation imposed upon employers to bargain in good faith is taken as 
the apotheosis of the right to bargain collectively then the right is a 
collective right since the right vests in the duly certified or recognized 
trade union and not in the individual worker.  
3.  The Limited Scope of the Positive Duty to Protect Collective 
Bargaining 
The fifth reason McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. offered for overturning 
the narrow interpretation of the freedom to associate provided in the 
Labour Trilogy and PIPSC is the need to adopt a contextual approach. 
Once again they put great store in Dunmore, which recognized that 
section 2(d) may place positive obligations on the government to extend 
legislation to particular groups. However, they were also careful to 
emphasize the limitations expressed in Dunmore on the scope of this 
positive duty; “there must be evidence that the freedom would be next to 
impossible to exercise without positively recognizing a right to access a 
statutory regime”.33  
The limited scope of the state’s obligation to provide protections for 
collective bargaining has its roots in the Supreme Court’s commitment 
to ensuring that the Charter only directly applies to governmental or 
public action. While there is a great deal of indeterminacy about what 
counts as public action in order to trigger the application of the Charter, 
the Supreme Court of Canada has continued to maintain its position, first 
articulated in Dolphin Delivery, that common law litigation between 
private parties is outside the purview of the Charter.34 What this 
restriction means in the employment context is that employers can use 
their common law rights enforced by judge-made common law doctrines 
to interfere with workers’ freedom to join unions and unions’ right to 
bargain collectively without having to worry that the Charter will unduly 
restrict them.35 
                                                                                                             
33
  Id., at para. 34. 
34
  R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.). 
35
  R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 
7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the common law 
restrictions on picketing in light of Charter values and disavowed the common law tort that rendered 
secondary picketing per se illegal. However, as the Court noted, there is a plethora of torts that can 
be used to limit the scope of picketing.  
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4.  The Right to Bargain Collectively as Purely Procedural 
The fourth reason that McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. gave for 
departing from precedent was their rejection of L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s 
suggestion in PIPSC that freedom of association was not intended to 
protect the objects or goals of an association. Instead, they developed a 
distinction — between a procedure and its substantive outcome — that is 
a crucial element in their positive definition of the right to bargain 
collectively. In contradistinction to L’Heureux-Dubé J. they claimed that 
it will always be possible to characterize the pursuit of a particular 
activity in concert with others as the “object” of that association. 
However, they acknowledged that her “underlying concern — that the 
Charter not be used to protect the substantive outcomes of any and all 
associations — is a valid one”.36 Invoking an early article by Bora 
Laskin — the grandfather of Canadian labour law and a former Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada — in support of their preferred 
distinction, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. declared that “‘collective 
bargaining’ as a procedure has always been distinguishable from its final 
outcomes (e.g., the results of the bargaining process, which may be 
reflected in a collective agreement)”.37 Thus, they concluded “it is entirely 
possible to protect the ‘procedure’ known as collective bargaining without 
mandating constitutional protection for the fruits of that bargaining 
process.”38  
5.  Substantive Equality and the Right to Bargain Collectively 
Having made the negative case for overturning precedent, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and LeBel J. resort to history, international law and Charter 
values to make the positive case that collective bargaining is protected 
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. They identify 
equality as one of the Charter values that the right to bargain collectively 
promotes:  
Collective bargaining also enhances the Charter value of equality. One 
of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining is to palliate 
                                                                                                             
36
  B.C. Health Services, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 29 (S.C.C.).  
37
  Id.  
38
  Id. 
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the historical inequality between employers and employees: see 
Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., per Iacobucci J.39  
Moreover, it is clear that the Court is endorsing a substantive 
conception of economic inequality, since McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. 
quote from Dickson C.J.C.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference:  
Freedom of association is the cornerstone of modern labour relations. 
Historically, workers have combined to overcome the inherent 
inequalities of bargaining power in the employment relationship and 
to protect themselves from unfair, unsafe, or exploitative working 
conditions.40 
The goal of fostering substantive equality could function as the 
normative basis for grounding a purely collective right to freely 
associate that vests in trade unions. However, in order to do so, the Court 
would need to provide a more detailed account of what constitutes 
inequality of bargaining power and the extent to which that inequality 
should be remedied. But instead of developing substantive equality as 
the normative basis for the constitutionally protected right to bargain 
collectively, the Court goes on to develop a very thin conception of the 
right from which a substantive vision of equality is virtually absent.  
6.  A Thin Conception of the Right to Bargain Collectively 
Having made the positive case for recognizing a right to bargain 
collectively, McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. proceed to explain what this 
right entails. In light of the judgment’s expansive rhetoric extolling 
collective bargaining as tantamount to a fundamental human right, what 
is striking is just how limited the right is. First, the Charter only applies 
to state action, that is, to legislation or to the government as an 
employer. The Charter does not apply to private employers directly. To 
succeed in arguing that under-inclusive legislation violates freedom of 
association, a claimant would have to demonstrate “the freedom would 
be next to impossible to exercise without positively recognizing a right 
to access a statutory regime”.41 In Dunmore, the Supreme Court held that 
the state had a positive duty to enact legislation to protect workers’ 
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  Id., at para. 84. 
40
  Id., quoting Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 334 
(S.C.C.).  
41
  Id., at para. 34 referring to Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 
(S.C.C.). 
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Charter rights if the party seeking the legislative protection could 
establish an evidentiary foundation that without legislative protection the 
workers would not be able to enjoy, form, join and participate in trade 
unions.42 Nothing in Dunmore requires the state to provide collective 
bargaining legislation where there is none.
43
 Second, section 2(d) does 
not guarantee the particular objectives sought through associational 
activity, only the process through which those goals are pursued. Third, 
the Charter does not protect all aspects of the associational activity of 
collective bargaining. It protects only against “substantial interference” 
with associational activity. Invoking Dunmore as support, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and LeBel J. assert “the state must not substantially interfere with 
the ability of a union to exert meaningful influence over working 
conditions through a process of collective bargaining conducted in 
accordance with the duty to bargain in good faith”.44 Fourth, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and LeBel J. were very careful to state that the right to collective 
bargaining protected by section 2(d) of the Charter is a limited right; 
“the right is to a general process of collective bargaining, not to a 
particular model of labour relations, not to a specific bargaining 
method”.
45
 The Court did not consider modifications to collective 
bargaining legislation to violate section 2(d). Thus, despite the bold 
statement at the beginning of judgment “that the s. 2(d) guarantee of 
freedom of association protects the capacity of members of labour 
unions to engage in collective bargaining on workplace issues”, the 
actual “right to collective bargaining … is a limited right”.46 
The scope of the constitutionally protected right to bargain 
collectively hinges on what substantial interference with the process of 
                                                                                                             
42
  Justice Bastarache concluded that the repeal of legislation extending labour legislation to 
agricultural workers was a signal to employers that they did not have to respect the workers’ 
fundamental rights. 
43
  Nevertheless, it may be difficult for the state to repeal collective bargaining legislation in 
the private sector entirely without putting anything in its place since this action could be considered 
a signal to employers to interfere with workers’ fundamental rights. At the very least, in the private 
sector some restrictions on employers’ exercise of their civil rights (such as to discharge employees 
for being union members) would seem to be warranted. In the public sector, since the employer is a 
state actor, there may be a more robust duty to bargain, perhaps even with unions representing less 
than a majority of workers. My thanks to Eric Tucker for the latter observation.  
44
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 36, at para. 90. 
45
  Id., at para. 91. 
46
  Id., at paras. 2 and 91. Despite the Court’s care in delineating how restrictive the 
constitutionally protected right to bargain collectively is, some commentators have asserted “it is 
clear that the Court’s collective bargaining scheme will impose substantial burdens on public sector 
employers”. Cameron, supra, note 5, citing Charney, supra, note 5.  
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collective bargaining means. Chief Justice McLachlin and LeBel J. went 
on to elaborate that substantial interference is to be assessed on two 
bases, both of which are essential: (1) the importance of the matter 
affected to the process of collective bargaining, and (2) the manner in 
which the measure impacts on the collective right to good faith 
negotiation and consultation. The essential question relating to the first 
basis is whether the subject matter of the particular instance of collective 
bargaining is such that interfering with bargaining over it will affect the 
ability of unions to pursue common goals effectively. While not 
determinative of this inquiry, the majority asserted that the more 
important the matter is to a union and its members, the more likely there 
is substantial interference with a section 2(d) right.47  
Once it is established that the government action impacts on a 
subject matter important to collective bargaining, then the second basis 
for determining substantial interference comes into play: does the state 
action respect the duty to consult and negotiate in good faith? In 
attempting to give this notoriously vague and indeterminate duty some 
content, the majority refers to ILO principles concerning collective 
bargaining, the Canada Labour Code and provincial labour relations 
legislation, remarks made by Senator Walsh in the Senate Committee 
hearings on the Wagner Act, academic commentators and Supreme 
Court judgments.48 The result is a confusing mishmash, in which the 
procedural aspect of the duty is emphasized, although a court’s right to 
evaluate the substance of negotiations in determining whether the duty 
of good faith had been met is reaffirmed. Further complicating matters, 
the majority introduces factors more appropriate to the section 1 
analysis, which addresses whether the infringement of the right is 
justified, into the determination of whether section 2(d) has been 
breached. According to McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J., the 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of legislative provisions, such as 
situations of exigency and urgency, may “affect the content and 
modalities of the duty to bargain in good faith”.49 However, these are the 
same factors that are considered in the determination of the justification 
for the violation. In fact, in the very next paragraph, they state that 
section 1 “may permit interference with the collective bargaining process 
                                                                                                             
47
  The examples the Court provided were laws or state actions that prevent meaningful 
discussion or consultation about working conditions or that nullify significant negotiated terms in 
existing collective agreements. 
48
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 36, at paras. 97-107. 
49
  Id., at para. 107. 
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on an exceptional and typically temporary basis, in situations, for 
example, involving essential services, vital state administration, clear 
deadlocks and national crisis”.50  
Thus, the Court’s commitment to furthering substantive economic 
equality through providing constitutional protection for the right to 
bargain collectively is belied by its articulation of what the right actually 
comprises. It is difficult to see how a purely procedural right to bargain 
collectively that is backed by an obligation on an employer to bargain in 
good faith can address substantive inequality in bargaining power unless 
such a right is reinforced by a dispute resolution procedure such as the 
right to strike. The extent of the gap between the Court’s rhetoric of 
substantive equality and the reality of the legal holding that implements 
it is, as we shall see in the following part, clearly manifest in McLachlin 
C.J.C. and LeBel J.’s dismissive treatment of the unions’ equality 
argument in the B.C. Health Services case.  
III. EQUALITY AT WORK 
1.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to Equality under 
the Charter51 
Equality is a contested concept that involves competing social 
values. It can be informed by the values of traditional liberalism, such as 
individualism and freedom, and understood in a formal sense as 
consistency in treatment, or it can be infused with the social democratic 
values, such as solidarity and welfare, which are aligned with 
substantive equality.52 The openness and generality of the language of 
equality requires courts to identify and to elaborate the values that 
equality serves.  
In 1989 the Supreme Court of Canada issued its first decision 
interpreting equality rights, Law Society of British Columbia v. 
Andrews,53 which became the touchstone for substantive equality. 
Writing for the majority, McIntyre J. adopted a comparative and 
                                                                                                             
50
  Id., at para. 108. 
51
  This section and the one that follows are based upon Judy Fudge, “Substantive Equality, 
the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Limits to Redistribution” (2007) 23 (2) S.A.J.H.R. 235-53 
[hereinafter “Fudge”]. 
52
  Gavin Anderson, “Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism” (2004) 
17 Can. J.L. & Jur. 31; Colleen Sheppard, “Inclusive Equality and New Forms of Social 
Governance” (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 45, at 57-63 [hereinafter “Sheppard”].  
53
  [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].  
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substantive approach to the guarantee of equality in section 15 that was 
directed to prohibiting discrimination. Although his decision was lauded 
both for rejecting the similarly situated approach and for placing the 
burden for justifying the legislative distinction on the party seeking to 
uphold the legislation, his notion of discrimination lacked a substantive 
focus on inequalities entrenched in social and historical practices, norms 
and attitudes. Instead, he favoured an individualized and decontextualized 
approach that focused on the distinction between individual merit and 
capacities, on the one hand, and, on the other, irrelevant stereotypes.54 
After Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada became deeply 
divided on how to interpret substantive equality.55 The question was 
what kind of legislative distinction was to count as discrimination. This 
question is contentious, and courts have many choices that they must 
make and justify when deciding cases involving the Charter’s equality 
rights. In an article entitled “Equality: The Most Difficult Right”, 
McLachlin C.J.C. described equality as a Tantalus promising “more than 
it can deliver”.56 She warned, “absolute substantive equality is 
impossible” because of “the diversity of our society and its foundation in 
the competition of the marketplace”.57 Thus, the exercise is one of 
drawing limits to substantive equality. According to her:  
A market-based representative democracy necessarily tolerates a 
certain degree of disparity, economic and otherwise. It is perhaps for 
this reason that the Canadian equality experience, expressed in human 
rights legislation as well as in the enumerated grounds of section 15, 
focuses on particular sources of inequality that have historically proven 
unjust and harmful to the affected individuals and to society as a 
whole.58  
The Court sees rectifying the situation of disadvantaged groups as the 
central goal of equality rights in the Canadian Charter.  
                                                                                                             
54
  This analysis of Andrews, id., draws upon research that I am conducting with my 
colleague Hester Lessard on the shifting meaning of equality in Canadian jurisprudence. 
55
  William Black & Lynn Smith, “The Equality Rights” (2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 315; Peter 
Hogg, “What Is Equality? The Winding Course of Judicial Interpretation” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
39 [hereinafter “Black & Smith”]; Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and 
Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299 [hereinafter “Martin”].  
56
  Beverley McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17, 
at 20. This article was written before Justice McLachlin became Chief Justice. 
57
  Id. 
58
  Id., at 20-21.  
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But the more difficult question, according to McLachlin C.J.C., is 
“whether, and if so, to what extent, [the ambit of the equality guarantee] 
should apply outside its traditional discrimination-oriented focus”.59 This 
difficulty arises because:  
The Charter positively accords Canadians equal benefit of the law and 
equal protection from the law’s burden. This can be argued to extend 
the guarantee of equality to matters beyond the scope of traditional 
anti-discrimination law, to equal provision of state benefits, even when 
the group excluded is not the object of historic discrimination.60  
The question here is whether the state’s “largesse has been appropriately 
distributed”; but, as the Chief Justice acknowledged, the problem is that 
the goal of equality in this context is less clear.61  
In 1999 in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration),62 a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada adopted an 
approach to equality that focused on the goal of protecting human 
dignity. Justice Iacobucci set out what has become the authoritative 
approach to interpreting the equality rights in section 15. He identified 
the purpose of section 15 as preventing  
… the violation of human essential dignity and freedom through the 
imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice, 
and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition 
at law as human beings or members of Canadian society, equally 
capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.63  
He also confirmed that the Court would continue to take the comparative 
approach to equality that it adopted in Andrews; “[u]ltimately, a court 
must identify differential treatment as compared to one or more persons 
or groups.”64  
The equality framework set out in Law involves three stages and the 
claimant has the burden at each stage. Only after the claimant has 
satisfied all of the three stages does the government have the burden of 
justifying the violation under section 1. The first inquiry focuses on the 
law or the impugned state action in order to determine whether it draws a 
distinction between the claimant and others on the basis of some 
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  Id., at 24. 
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  Id., at 25. 
61
  Id., at 26. 
62
  [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
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  Id. 
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  Id., at para. 56. 
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personal characteristics or fails to take account of a disadvantaged 
position resulting in differential treatment. There are two components of 
this stage — a distinction drawn by law and a difference in treatment 
compared to another group. At this stage it is necessary to identify a 
comparator in relation to which the claimant can properly claim unequal 
treatment. In the second stage the target of the inquiry is how the 
legislation is related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination or to a 
ground that is analogous to a prohibited ground. The third stage is an 
inquiry into the nature of the harm in order to determine whether there 
has been discrimination in a substantive sense. The focus is on whether 
the differential treatment harms or impairs the claimant’s dignity and 
Iacobucci J. set out four contextual factors to assist in this stage. These 
factors are: (1) the social disadvantage of the group represented by the 
claimant; (2) the correspondence between legislative distinctions and 
that actual need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant; (3) the 
ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned legislation on a more 
disadvantaged group; and (4) the nature of the claimant’s interest. The 
first and fourth factors go to the harm suffered by the claimant — the 
indignity, whereas the second and third factors save the legislation.65  
The effect of this framework for evaluating equality claims has been 
to restrict the redistributive impact of section 15. At the first stage a 
claimant must establish differential treatment under the law66 and at the 
second stage the claimant must establish that the differential treatment is 
on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground.67  
Identifying the appropriate comparator is necessary for identifying 
differential treatment and the grounds of the distinction, and it is relevant 
when considering many of the contextual factors in the discrimination 
analysis. The question of the appropriate comparator is up to the Court to 
decide, and it identifies the comparator on the basis of the subject matter 
of the legislation and “biological, historical, and sociological similarities 
or dissimilarities” between the claimant and others.68 Disputes about the 
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  Hester Lessard, “Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality 
Framework and Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)” (2004) 16 C.J.W.L. 165, at 173-
74.  
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  Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 
71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). 
67
  The Court has recognized sexual orientation, marital status and citizenship as analogous 
grounds: see Black & Smith, supra, note 55, at 397-414.  
68
  Law, supra, note 62, at paras. 56-58, 90; Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, at paras. 47, 52, 64 (S.C.C.); Auton, 
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relevant pool for comparison reveal disagreements about whether 
equality requires merely equal treatment or whether it aspires to a greater 
ambition to achieve a more equal distribution.69  
Moreover, the effect of interpreting equality through the lens of 
dignity has been to focus on discrimination and to narrow the ambit of 
substantive equality. So far the Court’s approach to dignity has tended to 
emphasize self-worth and integrity and to downplay material and systemic 
factors in determining whether equality rights have been violated.70 It has 
viewed equality claims through an identity-based recognition framework 
that displaces redistributive claims.71 The Court has also adopted a 
“reasonable person standard” for the determination of whether the 
distinction that disadvantages the claimant as compared to another group 
violates the claimant’s dignity.72 
Thus, while it is true that substantive equality entails a departure from 
the treatment of equality rights as negative rights and its remedies can 
include the extension both of benefits and legal protections,73 the 
                                                                                                             
supra, note 66; Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 
60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
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  Catherine Barnard & Bob Hepple, “Substantive Equality” (2000) 59 Cambridge L.J. 562. 
70
  Gwen Brodsky, “Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General): Autonomy with a Vengeance” 
(2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 194, at 212; Sheppard, supra, note 52, at 50; Martin, supra, note 55, at 329.  
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  It is not inevitable that recognition displaces redistribution since recognition can be seen 
in terms of status subordination and not only identity misrecognition; see Judy Fudge, “The 
Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the Imperialism of the Courts” in Tom 
Campbell, Keith Ewing & Adam Tomkins, eds., Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), at 335. 
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  In Law, supra, note 62, at para. 61, the Court specified that a subjective-objective 
standard should be used in assessing an injury to dignity. However, the Court has subsequently 
moved to an objective or reasonable person standard. See Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, 
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.). Recently, in R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41 (S.C.C.), 
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the legitimacy of the criticisms of the use of dignity both 
in and after Law  and reaffirmed the two-step approach to equality set out in Andrews, supra, note 53. 
73
  Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) addressed the 
issue of the appropriate remedy for discriminatory benefits. In Eldridge v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) the Court ordered the 
government of British Columbia to provide interpreter services for deaf patients who were using 
hospital services. In Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.) the Court 
ordered the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in Alberta’s 
anti-discrimination legislation. In Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) the Court held that the denial of benefits to sufferers of 
chronic pain was discriminatory and ordered that benefits be provided to them. However, in Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) a unanimous 
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a new approach to remedies for the violation of Charter 
protected-equality rights, denying the surviving same-sex spouses fully retroactive pension benefits. 
The Supreme Court’s restrictive approach to remedies for breaches of equality rights is discussed in 
Cristin Schmitz, “Top court’s restriction of Charter remedies seen as a major shift” The Lawyers 
Weekly, March 16, 2007, vol. 25, number 42, at 24.  
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redistributive potential of equality rights is quite small.74 It is important to 
remember that the majority of equality claims have been unsuccessful.75 In 
cases involving equality rights claims that directly target the ways in 
which governments raise and distribute material resources in areas such as 
income tax, pension, or social assistance policy it is rare that the claimant 
is able to establish discrimination.76 
2.  Newfoundland v. NAPE: “More than just a matter of dollars 
and cents”77 
In light of the fact that redistributive claims are rarely successful 
under section 15, Newfoundland v. NAPE was an unusual case.78 It was 
the first equality case brought by women in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the Charter’s equality guarantees had been violated.79 
But it was also the first equality case in which the Court justified the 
violation of equality rights solely on economic grounds.  
In 1988 the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador signed a 
pay equity agreement with five of its public sector trade unions that was 
designed to equalize the wages of women and men who performed work 
of the same value.80 Three years later when the government and the 
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  Margot Young, “Change at the Margins: Eldridge v. British Columbia and Vriend v. 
Alberta” (1998) 10 C.J.W.L. 244. 
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  Sheila McIntyre, “The Supreme Court and Section 15: A Thin and Impoverished Notion 
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  [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at para. 40 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J. He quoted 
the now notorious dissent of Dickson C.J.C. in the Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 
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  However, from the perspective of wage control legislation, Newfoundland v. NAPE is 
typical. The Supreme Court of Canada had previously decided that legislation revoking collective 
bargaining rights and ignoring collective agreements as a response to a financial emergency was 
constitutional: see Reference re Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 
373 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
424 (S.C.C.). 
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  Patricia Hughes, “Case Comment: Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.” (2004) 
11 C.L.E.L.J. 16, n. 47. It is also one of the two equality cases after Law in which the Court used 
s. 1 to uphold legislation that violated equality. The other case was Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. 
No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (S.C.C.), in which the federal civil service hiring preference in favour 
of Canadian citizens was held to be discriminatory but justified. 
80
  Pay equity is the term used in Canada for equal pay for work of equal value strategies. 
The purpose of pay equity is to redress the historical undervaluation of work that has traditionally 
been performed by women. 
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unions finally agreed upon the wage adjustments necessary to achieve 
pay equity, the government claimed that it was in a financial crisis. As 
part of a series of measures to deal with the provincial deficit, the 
government enacted public sector wage restraint legislation that 
cancelled the $24 million in pay equity wage adjustments that it owed to 
the women employed in the province’s health care sector.  
The Newfoundland Association of Public Employees (“NAPE”), 
which represented the predominantly female health care workers, managed 
to navigate successfully through the maze of equality jurisprudence; 
however, it was stymied at the section 1 stage. In 2004, a unanimous 
seven-member bench of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the 
legislation cancelling the pay equity debt on the ground that the 
province’s financial crisis justified violating the (predominantly women) 
workers’ equality rights. 
Justice Binnie began his equality analysis by noting “[t]he value 
placed on a person’s work is more than just a matter of dollars and 
cents”.81 Starting from this premise, he concluded that this case “fits 
easily within the framework established in Law v. Canada … which 
identified the affirmation of human dignity and self-worth as a central 
purpose of s. 15(1) of the Charter”.82 He found that the wage control 
legislation drew a formal distinction between those who were entitled to 
benefit from pay equity and everyone else; that the appropriate 
comparator group consisted of men in male-dominated classifications 
performing work of equal value; and that the differential treatment arose 
not merely because of the type of job, but rather because the job is one 
generally held by women. Having concluded that the first two steps of 
the Law analysis were fulfilled — a distinction resulting in a disadvantage 
in relation to a comparator group and a prohibited ground (in this case 
sex) — he moved on to consider whether the distinction amounted to 
discrimination in light of the four contextual factors set out in Law. 
The analysis of the first three factors was straightforward. What is 
interesting is Binnie J.’s treatment of the fourth factor — the nature of 
the claimant’s interest. The fact that the women workers were paid less 
than what their work was worth and that this low pay would translate 
into lower pensions was not of sufficient importance to merit 
constitutional protection. What was needed was some infringement of 
the women workers’ dignity. According to him, “[l]ow pay often denotes 
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low status jobs, exacting a price in dignity as well as dollars”.83 Thus he 
concluded that the wage restraint legislation violated the women 
workers’ equality rights, and in doing so he transformed a distributive 
claim into one involving dignity. 
However, despite his ringing endorsement of equality rights and  
the declaration that the Court must act as the referee who determines the 
boundaries of the legal exercise of state power, Binnie J. found that  
the provincial legislation was a demonstrably justified limitation of the 
women workers’ equality rights. His section 1 analysis demonstrates 
how easy it is for a government to override equality rights in the name of 
fiscal crisis. All the government has to do is declare a fiscal crisis in the 
legislature and the courts will take judicial notice of the emergency and 
defer to the government’s judgment in balancing women’s equality 
rights against competing social values.84 
3.  Equality in the B.C. Health Services Case: Nothing Personal  
In the B.C. Health Services case, the unions’ equality challenge 
emphasized the fact that employment in the health services sector is 
female dominated and that women’s work has historically been 
undervalued in order to engage the right to equality protected in section 
15. Here the main hurdle was the Law test. The specific difficulty facing 
the health services unions was to persuade the various levels of courts 
that the gendered nature of health service occupations could function as 
a personal characteristic that could ground a claim of discrimination. 
With the exception of L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s separate concurring reasons 
in Dunmore and an offhand remark by the majority in Delisle — two 
cases that dealt with freedom of association and collective bargaining for 
workers who were excluded from statutory schemes — there is no 
authority for the proposition that occupational status may be recognized 
as an analogous ground.85 
The health care unions urged the British Columbia Supreme Court to 
adopt a remedial and purposive approach to section 15, which assessed 
section 15 claims on a “contextual, flexible basis from the perspective of 
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the claimant”.86 As part of the “contextual matrix” the unions emphasized 
the disadvantage women suffer in employment, the prejudice and 
stereotyping attached to “women’s work”, and the importance of 
unionization and collective bargaining in overcoming this disadvantage.87 
With respect to the first step of the Law test, the plaintiff unions and 
health-care workers argued that occupational status is a personal 
characteristic central to one’s identity and sense of self and that by 
targeting health care workers Bill 29 failed to take account of the 
plaintiffs’ already disadvantaged status, which resulted in substantially 
different treatment between the plaintiffs and others on the basis of sex 
and working in a female-dominated occupational sector. They also 
identified the appropriate comparator group, which is the second element 
of the first step, as public sector workers who do not work in the most 
female-dominated sectors.88 Regarding the second step of the Law 
equality framework, the plaintiffs argued that the health care workers 
were disadvantaged on the basis of their sex, an enumerated ground, and 
the analogous ground of women’s jobs since only health care workers 
were targeted by the legislation, and that such workers are predominantly 
female.89 They also argued that the third step of the Law test was fulfilled 
since Bill 29 denied the benefit of collective bargaining only to health 
care workers and that this drew a distinction on the basis of a personal 
characteristic and perpetuated the view that these workers are not as 
deserving of respect and consideration as other unionized workers.90  
To begin her analysis of the health care workers and unions’ equality 
claim, Garson J. set out the three broad inquiries of the Law framework, 
and emphasized the need to adopt a purposive and contextual approach. 
She also stressed the comparative aspect of the equality analysis, and 
insisted that it was up to the court to determine the appropriate comparator. 
Although Garson J. of the British Columbia Supreme Court accepted 
both the unions’ evidence that the majority of workers affected by Bill 
29 were women and were disproportionately members of visible minority 
groups and the undisputed evidence given by the plaintiff’s expert Pat 
Armstrong that women’s work is subject to systemic discrimination and 
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undervaluation,91 it was clear that she was not amenable to the section 15 
claim. The key problem was that she did “not see how Bill 29 draws a 
distinction between the plaintiffs and the comparator group on the basis 
of personal characteristics”.92 According to her, the relevant comparator 
group was unionized public sector workers outside of the health care 
sector.93 She concluded that the distinction being drawn in Bill 29 “is 
simply between different sectors within the broader public sector; it is 
not based upon the personal characteristics of the employees within 
these sectors”.94 Moreover, she went on to declare: 
I do not consider the status of the plaintiffs as health care workers to be 
a personal characteristic. This is particularly so given the broad and 
disparate occupational classification that health care workers encompass 
and because one’s personal choice [of occupation] is not an immutable 
characteristic.95  
Thus, the unions’ claim failed both aspects of the first step of the Law 
test.  
There are at least two problems with Garson J.’s analysis of the first 
stage of the Law framework. The first is her failure to appreciate the 
extent to which labour markets use ascribed characteristics, such as sex, 
race and ethnicity, to allocate individuals to specific types of jobs. Labour 
market analysts, especially those who study labour market segmentation 
(how labour markets are composed of non-competing sectors with 
profoundly different terms and conditions of employment and job 
ladders) have demonstrated how personal characteristics such as sex and 
race are used as markers by firms to allocate employment opportunities 
and to justify difference in employment terms.96 Since specific kinds of 
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jobs are readily available to specific types of workers, such workers tend 
to “choose” these jobs. However, this choice is shaped by broader 
institutional factors, institutional factors that are, in turn, the residue of a 
legacy of historical discrimination.  
The second, and more troubling, problem is that Garson J. has 
simply failed to appreciate the extent to which facially neutral distinctions 
have an adverse impact on individuals on the basis of personal 
characteristics. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized adverse 
impact discrimination in 1985 in O’Malley.97 Moreover, in Meiorin the 
Supreme Court recognized that adverse impact analysis was not 
necessarily confined to minority groups; in that case the Court accepted 
that a physical fitness standard designed for men had a discriminatory 
impact on women, despite the fact that some women met the test, and 
some men did not.98 While it is true that the Supreme Court adopted the 
concept of adverse-effect discrimination in the context of interpreting 
human rights legislation, and not the equality rights in the Charter, it is 
unclear why this concept is inapposite to establishing the first step in the 
Law approach to discrimination.99 The British Columbia government 
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may not have selected health care workers for special, and very 
detrimental, treatment because the overwhelming majority of such 
workers were women, but nonetheless the impact of selecting health care 
workers was disproportionately to disadvantage women workers — a 
group which can be identified on the basis of a shared personal 
characteristic.  
Despite her conclusion that the plaintiff’s equality argument failed to 
meet the requirements of the first stage of the Law analysis, Garson J. 
went through the remaining two steps. She considered the second step: Is 
the claimant subject to differential treatment based on one or more 
enumerated and analogous grounds? Here she specifically considered the 
dicta in Dunmore and Delisle that occupational status could be an 
analogous ground,100 and asked whether health care workers were more 
like agricultural workers (as was the case in Dunmore) or police officers 
(as was the case in Delisle). She concluded “they cannot be described in 
the same way as the agricultural workers in Dunmore. I do not think for 
the purposes of a s. 15 analysis the occupational group ‘health care 
workers’ or ‘unionized health care workers’ can be seen as sharing the 
same immutable characteristics”.101 According to her, the unique 
circumstances surrounding health care work is the distinguishing factor, 
and correspondence with sex or women’s work is not the basis of the 
legislation. Thus, she concluded that the second step of the Law test had 
not been made out.  
Once again the problem with Garson J.’s analysis is that she ignores 
the adverse impact that legislation targeting unionized health care 
workers has upon women workers, a group that has been historically 
discriminated against.102 It appears that she has imported the requirement 
that the government “intend” to target health care workers because they 
are women into her analysis of the second step in the Law framework. A 
tacit requirement of intentional discrimination is the only way to 
understand the following assertion: 
The true effect of the law is not upon “women” or “those who perform 
women’s work” it is upon those who perform health care work in 
British Columbia’s unionized public sector. The unique circumstances 
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surrounding that work is the distinguishing factor: correspondence with 
sex or “women’s work” is not the basis of the legislation.103  
Given that Garson J. accepted the evidence that the overwhelming 
majority of workers who would be affected by Bill 29 are women, it is 
indisputable that a “true effect” of the law is upon women workers. 
Moreover, it is not clear what she meant by the “unique circumstances 
surrounding that work”, unless she is referring to the fact that the work 
was covered by a collective agreement that the government no longer 
wanted to honour.  
In considering the third step, does the differential treatment 
discriminate, Garson J. focused on dignity. She concluded: “[w]hile the 
plaintiffs are clearly aggrieved by the legislation for various justifiable 
reasons, the impact upon them is not of the quality or characteristic that 
impacts their dignity in the sense that it engages s. 15”.104 She did not 
offer any argument in support of this conclusion; instead she simply 
recited a list of cases in which the Supreme Court and various appeal 
courts had decided that a distinction based on a personal characteristic 
did not impair the dignity of the individuals who shared the characteristic.105  
The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld each element of the 
trial judge’s section 15 analysis. Moreover, speaking for a unanimous 
bench, Thackery J. went on to elaborate that the appellants’ submission: 
… was more of a political assault than a legal argument. Its emotional 
base does not contain any reference to evidence or to legal principles 
that ground an argument based upon the test in Law. There can be no 
doubt but that the appellants, whether they be the associations of 
individuals or the individuals themselves, are angry. They were given, 
by one government, rights that were used to improve union power and 
individual incomes. Another government took away some of that 
power and some of the economic benefits.106 
Despite the fact that it was not necessary for the Supreme Court of 
Canada to address the section 15 claim, since the appellant unions were 
successful under section 2(d), the Court provided a cursory and 
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disappointing discussion of the equality argument.107 The Supreme Court 
signalled its refusal to consider seriously the equality claim when it 
refused LEAF’s motion to intervene.108 The majority dismissed the 
appellant unions’ section 15 claim in six paragraphs. Despite the pain 
inflicted by Bill 29 on health care workers, the Court refused to depart 
from the view of the trial court judge that the effects of the legislation 
did not constitute discrimination under section 15.109 The Court concluded: 
… the distinctions made by the Act relate essentially to segregating 
different sectors of employment, in accordance with the long-standing 
practice in labour regulation of creating legislation specific to particular 
segments of the labour force, and do not amount to discrimination 
under s. 15 of the Charter. The differential and adverse effects of the 
legislation on some groups of workers relate essentially to the type of 
work they do, and not to the persons they are. Nor does the evidence 
disclose that the Act reflects the stereotypical application of group or 
personal characteristics. Without minimizing the importance of the 
distinctions made by the Act to the lives and work of affected health 
care employees, the differential treatment based on personal characteristics 
required to get a discrimination analysis off the ground is absent here.110 
The Court’s focus on combating stereotypes as the rationale for 
providing constitutional protection for equality rights enabled it to sever 
its analysis of the equality claim from its analysis of the freedom to 
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associate despite the fact that it had earlier justified the latter as 
including a right to bargain collectively because it promotes the Charter 
value of substantive economic equality. Moreover, the Court’s analysis 
ignored the extent to which labour legislation reflects and reinforces 
historical patterns of labour market discrimination and segregation.111 
The “long standing practice in labour regulation of creating legislation 
specific to particular segments in the labour force” may be neutral on its 
face but it has profoundly disparate and disadvantageous impacts upon 
workers. The historical exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers 
from private sector labour relations legislation is simply one contemporary 
example.112 The majority’s assertion that “the differential and adverse 
effects” of the impugned legislation on some groups of workers “relate 
essentially to the type of work they do, and not to the type of persons 
they are” demonstrates a cavalier disregard of statements made earlier in 
the judgment that emphasize the significance of work to an individual’s 
sense of identity, self-worth and dignity.113 And the claim that the 
“evidence does not disclose that the Act reflects the stereotypical 
application of group or personal characteristics” evinces a complete lack 
of awareness of the extent to which ascribed characteristics such as sex 
are used to channel individuals into given occupations. This lack of 
awareness is surprising given that Abella J. was part of the majority, and 
in 1984 she had released a report called Equality in Employment that 
documented the degree of occupational discrimination experienced by 
women.114 Most remarkably, the Court appears to have forgotten Binnie 
J.’s remark in Newfoundland v. NAPE, made only three years earlier, 
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that “[t]he value placed on a person’s work is more than just a matter of 
dollars and cents”.115 
It would be unfair to fault Garson J. for failing to refer to 
Newfoundland v. NAPE in 2003, since the Supreme Court of Canada 
released its judgment in 2004, a year after her decision. Newfoundland v. 
NAPE should have strengthened the B.C. health care unions’ equality 
argument before the Supreme Court. As we saw, Binnie J. had no 
difficulty in concluding that the Newfoundland and Labrador wage 
control legislation violated the health care workers’ equality rights. 
Although the B.C. legislation did not directly discriminate by 
specifically targeting women’s work, as did the Newfoundland wage-
control legislation, the impact of the B.C. legislation was indirectly to 
disadvantage a group of workers the overwhelming majority of whom 
were women. The fact that the Supreme Court did not refer to the 2004 
case in its equality analysis of the B.C. Health Services case, especially 
given that the majority referred to the earlier case in its analysis of 
whether the infringement of the freedom to associate by the B.C. 
legislation was justified, is inexplicable.116 Moreover, given the pay 
equity subtext of the B.C. Health Services case, which I shall explain, 
the failure of the Supreme Court to address seriously the equality 
argument is inexcusable.117  
In British Columbia there is no pay equity legislation that imposes 
an obligation on either public or private sector employers to remedy the 
widely recognized wage gap between female dominated and male 
dominated jobs. Unions, such as the Hospital Employees Union, which 
represents 90 per cent of health care workers in British Columbia, 
embarked on an aggressive strategy of closing what was recognized to 
be a gender-based wage gap between jobs filled predominantly by 
women and jobs filled predominantly by men. This strategy involved 
human rights complaints, negotiations backed by strikes and grievances. 
In 1995 the British Columbia government, which was led by the New 
Democratic Party, introduced the Public Sector Employers’ Council Pay 
                                                                                                             
115
  Newfoundland v. NAPE, [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at para. 40 (S.C.C.). 
He quoted the now notorious dissent of Dickson C.J.C. in the Alberta Reference, [1987] S.C.J. No. 
10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, at 368 (S.C.C.), that “[w]ork is one of the most fundamental aspects in a 
person’s life.” The Supreme Court’s equality analysis in Newfoundland v. NAPE was brought to the 
Court’s attention by the appellants in their factum, the Health Services and Support-Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. B.C., Court File No. 30554, at paras. 137, 165. 
116
  B.C. Health Services, supra, note 110, at paras. 145 and 147. 
117
  The pay equity context of the case was brought to the Court’s attention by the appellants 
in their factum, supra, note 115, at para. 127.  
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) CONCEPTUALIZING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 243 
Equity Framework, which imposed an obligation on public sector 
employers such as hospitals to develop pay equity plans, to file these 
plans with the government, and to put aside 1 per cent of pay roll each 
year in order to close the gender-based wage gap. The same year, the 
Fraser Institute released a report claiming that the high wages for non-
clinical health care workers was causing a crisis in the Canadian health 
care system. By 2001, health care workers in British Columbia enjoyed 
the highest wage rates and the lowest wage gap between men and 
women of any jurisdiction in Canada.118 
When the Liberal Party was elected to form the British Columbia 
government in 2001, pay equity adjustments for the public sector were 
scheduled for 2002 and 2003. Instead of revoking the Public Sector 
Employers’ Council Pay Equity Framework, the government repealed 
the amendment to the Human Rights Act, which had been enacted by the 
N.D.P. government in its dying days, that imposed pay equity obligations 
on private sector employers.119 At the same time, it appointed a Task 
Force, led by a single commissioner (who later represented the 
government in its defence of the Charter challenge brought by health 
care unions against Bill 29) to recommend whether or not pay equity 
legislation for the private sector was required. In her report, Nitya Iyer 
recommended against introducing pay equity legislation for the private 
sector, although she acknowledged the existence of a gender-based wage 
gap, part of which could only be explained by the history of discrimination 
against women in employment.120 Thus, one effect of Bill 29, which 
resulted in the privatization of many non-clinical health care worker 
jobs, was not only to relieve the government of having to pay higher 
wages to health care workers in female-dominated jobs, but to permit the 
private firms that were contracted to provide services to revert to paying 
discriminatory wages with little risk that their practices would be 
challenged.121   
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IV. PUTTING CHARTER RIGHTS TO WORK:  
THE REALPOLITIK OF LITIGATION 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s conception of the Charter’s 
guarantee of the freedom to associate and equality is both shaped and 
reinforced by the practicalities of constitutional litigation. It takes a great 
deal of time and resources to mount a constitutional challenge. When 
unions challenge legislation on the ground that it interferes either with 
the freedom to associate or equality rights they are challenging 
legislation that has already taken effect. Thus, even when they are 
successful, as they were in Dunmore and the B.C. Health Services case, 
the Supreme Court’s remedy is typically to suspend the declaration of 
invalidity in order to give the government time to come up with a 
solution. In Dunmore, the Ontario government adopted a parsimonious 
approach to the Supreme Court’s ruling, one that did not even provide 
for collective bargaining rights for agricultural workers.122 Moreover, the 
subsequent Liberal government, which in its election platform promised 
to provide collective bargaining rights to agricultural workers, 
vigorously defended against a constitutional challenge to the former 
Conservative government’s Agricultural Employees Protection Act.123 
After the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the B.C. Health 
Services case the parties were able to agree upon a substantial settlement 
to the case, $85 million, the vast majority of which will be distributed to 
individual workers.124 However, the unions which brought the successful 
challenge still had to go through the laborious and expensive process of 
organizing the workers’ whose jobs were contracted out because the 
changes to the successor rights provisions in Bill 29 did not infringe s. 
2(d) of the Charter. Nor will the successful challenge to Bill 29 prevent 
the B.C. government from either continuing to privatize health care 
services or from changing collective agreements as long as the 
government consults with the unions representing the workers before 
doing so.  
Constitutional litigation does not take place on a level playing field; 
governments that are defending impugned legislation typically have a 
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great deal more resources than do the unions that are challenging the 
legislation. This gives the government a big advantage, and puts unions 
on the defensive.125 Moreover, the huge amount of resources spent on 
lawyers and experts that goes into defending and challenging legislation 
would be much more usefully spent on developing policies that respond 
to the profound changes in the labour market that have occurred over the 
past 20 years. Once the parties begin to spend resources on either 
challenging or defending a specific piece of legislation they dig into their 
positions and lose the ability to think of creative solutions to the conflict 
within which they are engaged. 
Constitutional litigation tends to promote a winner-take-all approach 
that influences how the parties approach both the evidence they adduce 
and the arguments that they make. My own very limited experience as an 
expert witness in constitutional cases suggests that the parties are now 
much more concerned about the record than they were in the past.126 
However, the fact that the record is of increasing significance in labour 
cases does not necessarily mean that the quality of the evidence has 
improved. In many cases, it simply means that the behaviour of the 
lawyers involved has changed. An anecdote will illustrate this point. 
When I was cross-examined on the affidavits that I prepared for 
Dunmore, the cross-examination was very similar to a thesis 
examination — courteous, rigorous and directed to the matters at issue. 
Eight years later when I was cross-examined for the affidavits that I 
prepared for Fraser v. Ontario, the cross-examination was an ordeal of 
endurance marked by discourtesy.127  
Constitutional litigation is not compatible with the complexity of 
historical nuance or sticky policy issues that inevitably involves trade-
offs.128 Lawyers have an incentive to simplify the issues at stake in 
Charter cases and they necessarily engage in results-based reasoning 
since they are working for clients who give them instructions and who 
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  According to Paul Cavalluzzo, unions which bring Charter challenges to legislation must 
be prepared to spend half a million dollars to take a case to the Supreme Court of Canada (remarks 
made by him at the Constitutional Case 2007, Conference, Toronto, April 18, 2008). 
126
  See Dunmore, [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, at para. 35 (S.C.C.) for the 
significance of the record in the determination of the violation of s. 2(d) and B.C. Health Services, 
supra, note 110, at para. 156 regarding the significance of the record for the s. 1 analysis.  
127
  For example, despite having been accepted as an expert on matters pertaining to 
agricultural workers and the labour law relating to them, in Fraser my curriculum vitae was subject 
to several hours of extensive and aggressive cross-examination. 
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  Eric Tucker, “The Constitutional Right to Bargain Collectively: The Ironies of Labour 
History in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 61 Labour/Le Travail 151.  
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want to win. The parties often over-egg their arguments and positions 
since constitutional litigation, not infrequently, is as much about political 
symbolism as it is about legal argument. For these reasons, constitutional 
litigation tends to reinforce rather than act as an antidote to partisan 
politics.  
The most profound problem that I see with constitutional litigation 
in pursuit of protecting labour rights is that even when it is successful it 
typically is defensive. Unions have gone to court to defend the key 
features of industrial pluralism — a system of collective bargaining that 
originated with the Wagner Act in 1935 and that was adapted to Canada 
with the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations129 in 1944. That system 
was designed for the post-war economy, and even at its apogee covered 
less than half of the working population in Canada. Since the early 
1980s, at the very time the Charter was entrenched, this system has 
proven to be less effective as the supply and demand sides of the labour 
market have changed; the wages of unionized workers have stagnated 
and union density has declined.130 While it is heartening for people who 
are concerned with the dignity of workers that the Supreme Court has 
elevated collective bargaining to a constitutional right, it is unlikely that 
defensive battles fought in courts can turn the economic and political 
tide that has undermined the basis for transforming these rights into job 
security and improved wages for working people. Nor is it likely the 
courts will devise models of representation that can revive a flagging 
labour market. Courts appear to be helpful only when unions are weak.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Giving content to fundamental rights is not an easy task. Moreover, 
in a democracy it is appropriate that courts exercise humility when using 
their mandate to strike down legislation. In the two cases in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada has begun to elaborate a more robust 
constitutionally protected freedom to associate in the labour context, the 
governments whose actions were successfully challenged had introduced 
legislation repealing collective bargaining rights without consulting with 
the trade unions who represented the affected workers and they had used 
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  Order-in-Council P.C. 1003. 
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  Judy Fudge, “Beyond Vulnerable Workers? Towards a New Standard Employment 
Relationship” (2005) 12(2) C.L.E.L.J. 145-70; Judy Fudge, “The New Workplace: Surveying the 
Landscape”, Pitblado Conference, Winnipeg, November 9 and 10, 2007. 
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their majorities to pass legislation without a public debate. After the B.C. 
Health Services case, at a minimum, governments will have to consider 
public sector workers’ rights and to consult with their unions before 
introducing draconian legislation that substantially interferes with the 
process of collective bargaining. Thus, the Court’s emphasis on the 
government’s duty to bargain in good faith fosters democratic deliberation 
and imposes an inhibition on an instinctive vilification of public sector 
workers’ rights.  
Despite its newfound appreciation of workers’ rights, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has endorsed only a thin, procedural understanding of 
collective bargaining that tends to reify the existing industrial pluralist 
model of labour legislation. Nor has it grappled with the hard question of 
when the state has an obligation to protect workers from the exercise of 
private power — a power that is shaped and reinforced by deeply 
embedded common law rules.131 Although the Court invoked substantive 
equality as one of the Charter values that supported providing 
constitutional protection for the right to bargain collectively, it did not 
develop the link between equality and the freedom to associate.132 In fact, 
the Court’s dismissive treatment of the health care workers’ equality 
claim suggests that substantive equality has little judicial purchase in the 
world of work. 
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  In Dunmore, supra, note 126, the Court narrowly circumscribed the positive obligation 
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